We examine the role of stochastic feasibility in consumer choice using a random conditional choice set rule (RCCSR) and uniquely characterize the model from conditions on stochastic choice data. Feasibility is modeled to permit correlation in availability of alternatives. This provides a natural way to examine substitutability/complementarity. We show that an RCCSR generalizes the random consideration set rule of Manzini and Mariotti (2014) . We then relate this model to existing literature. In particular, an RCCSR is not a random utility model.
Introduction
We investigate the role of stochastic feasibility in consumer choice. Consider a researcher with scanner data on a consumer's purchases from repeated visits to grocery stores. In addition, each store supplies the researcher with the list of offered alternatives. However, there is random variation of alternatives that are available to consumers that is unknown to the researcher. For example, the researcher may not know if a delivery is delayed, food is spoiled, or some alternatives are out of stock.
1
In each case, a rational consumer's choices will depend on the available alternatives. Therefore, random variation in feasibility causes a rational consumer's choices to appear stochastic to the researcher. Hence, stochastic feasibility induces a stochastic choice function.
2
The events mentioned above may cause correlation in availability of alternatives. For example, a delivery truck carrying meat and dairy may be delayed, a disease can spoil certain fruits, and stock-outs may depend on similar products being offered. When feasibility is driven by stock-outs, correlation provides a natural way to discuss substitutability/complementarity.
3 For example, we say two alternatives are substitutes if there is negative correlation in feasibility because one alternative is less likely to be available in the presence of the other.
4
We model stochastic feasibility using a Random Conditional Choice Set Rule (RCCSR). An RCCSR assumes the agent has deterministic preferences while feasibility is driven by an exogenous stochastic process. In particular, the probability of a particular set being feasible is conditioned on the offered menu. This feature permits correlation in availability which facilitates discussion of substitutability/complementarity. We model the possibility that the feasible set is empty with a default option. We show that an RCCSR is uniquely characterized from conditions on stochastic choice data (Theorem 3.1) . Further, we demonstrate how an RCCSR generalizes the random consideration set rule of Manzini and Mariotti (2014) (henceforth MM) and provide a new characterization (Theorem 3.3) .
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces notation and defines an RCCSR. Section 3 uniquely characterizes an RCCSR using conditions on stochastic choice data. Section 4 demonstrates how an RCCSR differs from existing models.
Definitions and notation
Let X be a non-empty finite set of alternatives and D a domain of menus which are subsets of X. We assume that the domain satisfies the following richness condition: {a, b} ∈ D for all distinct a, b ∈ X and B ∈ D whenever A ∈ D and B ⊆ A.
5 Let the default option option be x * / ∈ X. The default option is available for each menu and can be interpreted as choosing nothing or not choosing from a particular class of alternatives. 6 We use the notation X * = X ∪ {x * } and A * = A ∪ {x * } for all A ∈ D.
Definition 2.1. A random choice rule is a map P : X * × D → [0, 1] such that: for all A ∈ D, a∈A * P (a, A) = 1; for all a / ∈ A * , P (a, A) = 0; and for all A ∈ D \ ∅, for all a ∈ A * , P (a, A) ∈ (0, 1).
In the above definition, P (a, A) is the probability that alternative a is chosen from A * . When the menu is empty, the default option x * is always chosen, so P (x * , ∅) = 1. For all A ∈ D and B ⊆ A * , we denote P (B, A) = b∈B P (b, A). We investigate the behavior of an agent whose preferences are given by a strict total ordering on X.
7 For any A ∈ D, we denote the set of feasible alternatives as F (A) ⊆ A. We call F (A) the feasible set. An agent's choice is made by maximizing over alternatives in F (A). We allow F (A) to be empty, in which case the agent chooses the default option x * . Therefore, P (x * , A) is the probability that F (A) is empty.
For a random conditional choice set rule (RCCSR), we consider a full support probability distribution π on D. Thus, there is a positive probability each A ∈ D is feasible.
8 When D = 2 X , π(A) represents the probability that A is feasible in X. For a menu A, the probability of facing the feasible set B ⊆ A is
If B is not a subset of A, then P r(F (A) = B) = 0. Thus, the probability of facing a given feasible set is conditioned on the offered menu. 9 For a menu A ∈ D and a ∈ A, 5 This domain assumption captures two important special cases: classical stochastic choice framework and classical binary stochastic choice.
6 Outside of an experimental study, it may be difficult to observe a consumer "choosing" nothing. This can be ameliorated if one is interested in consumer choice within a class of alternatives. For example, if the researcher is concerned about the purchase of fruit, the default option could be interpreted as "did not buy fruit".
7 A strict total ordering is an asymmetric, transitive, and weakly connected binary relation. A binary relation on a set X is asymmetric if for all x, y ∈ X, x y implies that y x does not hold. The relation is transitive if for all x, y, z ∈ X, [x y and y z] implies x z. The relation is weakly connected if for all a, b ∈ X such that a = b, then a b or b a. 8 We find this condition reasonable for the feasibility interpretation. However, this is hardly defensible for consideration sets. We refer the reader to Appendix C of the Supplemental Material for a model where an agent considers at most a pair of alternatives. 9 We discuss an alternative type of conditioning in Appendix B of the Supplemental Material.
let A a = {B ⊆ A | a ∈ B and ∀b ∈ B \ {a} a b}. A a is the set of subsets of A where a is the most preferred alternative. We now formally define an RCCSR. Definition 2.2. A random conditional choice set rule (RCCSR) is a random choice rule P ,π for which there exists a pair ( , π), where is a strict preference ordering on X and π : D → (0, 1) a full support probability distribution over D, such that for all A ∈ D and for all a ∈ A
Thus, P ,π (a, A) is the probability that a is the best feasible alternative when offered menu A. Menu-dependence is clear since P r(F (A) = B) is conditioned on the subsets of the offered menu. Further, an RCCSR incorporates correlation in availability of alternatives.
We now define the random consideration set rule of Manzini and Mariotti (2014) (MM) which we re-characterize in Section 3.3.
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Definition 2.3. A random consideration set rule is a random choice rule P ,γ for which there exists a pair ( , γ), where is a strict preference ordering on X and γ is a map γ : X → (0, 1), such that for all A ∈ D and for all a ∈ A that
The random consideration set rule is a simple model with only |X| parameters which represent how likely an object is considered. Setting π(A) = b∈X\A (1 − γ(b)) a∈A γ(a) gives P ,π = P ,γ . Hence, a random consideration set rule is a special case of an RCCSR.
Characterization

Revealed Preference and Limited Data
The revealed preference relation of our model is based on a sequential independence condition. We say that alternative b is sequentially independent from alternative a in menu A ∈ D for menus |A| ≥ 2 denoted bI A a if
Assuming an agent faces random feasible sets and has a deterministic preference with a b, then b will be chosen only if a is not available. Thus, it seems reasonable 10 Horan (2014) provides a characterization of a random consideration set rule without a default alternative. See Section 3.1 for a discussion on difficulties with removing the default option.
that the agent chooses b independent of a not being available. However, the term P (A * \{a}, A) is the probability a is not available in A. Thus, sequential independence is the case described. In contrast, the most preferred option is chosen when available with any other alternatives. Hence, removal of a sub-optimal alternative may cause non-independent changes to the choice probability of a.
We define the revealed preference relation by a b if and only if bI A a for some menu A with a, b ∈ A. In contrast, the revealed preference relation˜ of MM is given by a˜ b if and only if P (b, A) < P (b, A \ {a}) for some menu A, so the revealed preference relation implies˜ .
Upon rearranging, one sees that sequential independence is a hazard rate condition. For example, bI A a if and only if the probability of choosing b in A \ {a} is the hazard rate
.
We see that the probability b is chosen from the set A \ {a} is the same as the probability b is chosen from A conditional on a being sold out. This relaxes the "stochastic path independence" of a random consideration set choice rule in MM.
11
Now suppose we observe stochastic choice data of all alternatives from only two menus A, B ∈ D generated by an RCCSR. What can we infer about π and ? Suppose B = A \ {b} for some alternative b ∈ A. Then, we can determine b's rank relative to all alternatives in A. To see this, note that any c ∈ A \ {b} satisfying
must also satisfy b c. This is because the choice frequencies of all goods inferior to b change by the same proportion as the change in choice frequency of x * once b is removed from the menu. All alternatives a such that the equality does not hold satisfy a b. Thus, b's rank among the alternatives is established.
Further, it is possible to find the probability that b is feasible in A since
C⊆A π(C)
We can then use that
to place bounds on π with limited data.
12
Now consider an RCCSR when the feasible set must be nonempty, so π is a probability distribution over D\∅. As in MM, an RCCSR lacks unique identification once the default option is removed. For example, let X = {a, b} and suppose P (a, {a, b}) = α and P (b, {a, b}) = β.
13 This is consistent with a b and π({a}) + π({a, b}) = α and π({b}) = β or with b a and π({a}) = α and π({b}) + π({a, b}) = β. However, if D = 2 X we can still identify a revealed preference ordering which is unique up to the two least preferred alternatives. That is, for any distinct a, b, c ∈ X we can identify the most preferred alternative among them by evoking sequential independence on the menu {a, b, c}. Whether the default option can be removed by a process similar to Horan (2014) remains an open question.
Characterization of RCCSR
We now characterize an RCCSR using conditions on stochastic choice data. ASI : (Asymmetric Sequential Independence) For all distinct a, b ∈ X, exactly one of the following holds:
aI {a,b} b or bI {a,b} a.
ASI assumes that the alternatives are asymmetric in sequential independence. The intuition for this condition was argued earlier when discussing the revealed preference relation. TSI: (Transitive Sequential Independence) For all distinct a, b, c ∈ X, aI {a,b} b and bI {b,c} c ⇒ aI {a,c} c.
TSI says that if a is chosen independently when b is not feasible and b is chosen independently when c is not feasible in their respective binary menus, then a is chosen independently when c is not feasible in menu {a, c}. This condition imposes that the I relation is an ordering over alternatives in binary menus. ESI: (Expansive Sequential Independence) For all a ∈ X and all menus A, B ∈ D such that a ∈ A ∩ B, if ∀b ∈ A \ {a} bI A a and ∀c ∈ B \ {a} cI B a ⇒ ∀d ∈ A ∪ B \ {a} dI A∪B a.
ESI expands sequential independence from binary to arbitrary menus. It says if an agent chooses alternatives independently when a is not feasible in different menus, then they are still chosen independently when a is not feasible in the union of the menus.
We introduce some new notation for the following condition. For all A ∈ D \ ∅,
be the odds of the feasible set being nonempty in menu A. For the
. Let B = {B 1 , . . . , B n } be any collection of sets such that B i ∈ D. Let 13 Note that P (a, {a}) = P (b, {b}) = 1 in this framework.
O A\B 1 be the successive marginal differences of feasible odds. IFO: (Increasing Feasible Odds) For any A ∈ D \ ∅, |A| ≥ 2, and for any finite collection B = {B 1 , . . . , B n } with B i ∈ D,
IFO states that enlarging the menu decreases the odds the default option is chosen at an increasing rate.
14 Aguiar (2015) further examines successive difference conditions on choice probabilities to study the role of capacities in stochastic choice. We note this condition is equivalent to a multiplicative version of the Block-Marschak polynomials on the default option. Thus, choice of the default option behaves as if in a random utility model. In particular, IFO is equivalent to the condition that for all A ∈ D such that |A| ≥ 2,
One can make other restrictions on how choice probabilities of the default option behave when removing alternatives. For example, if we instead require that the choice frequency of the default option exhibits a menu-independent marginal effect when adding an alternative, we arrive at the random consideration set model of MM (Theorem 3.3). We also characterize a model where π has limited support in Appendix C of the Supplemental Material. We now present the main result.
Theorem 3.1. A random choice rule satisfies ASI, TSI, ESI, and IFO if and only if it is an RCCSR P ,π . Moreover, both and π are unique, that is, for any RCCSR with P ,π = P ,π we have that ( , π) = ( , π ).
All proofs can be found in Appendix A. We give intuition for showing sufficiency. We first show the revealed preference relation described previously is a strict preference ordering using ASI, TSI, and ESI. Next, we show that the probability of choosing the default option has the an RCCSR representation on the domain. We then prove the representation holds for arbitrary alternatives on singleton and binary menus. Finally, we extended the representation to all other menus via induction. We then define a valid probability distribution π using IFO and a Möbius inversion formula.
We now present a lemma used in the proof of the main result.
Lemma 3.1. If ASI, TSI, and ESI hold, then for any A ∈ D such that |A| ≥ 2 and a ∈ A such that ∀b ∈ A \ {ã}ã b we have that x * I Aã .
14 Note this defines a capacity from the odds that the feasible set is non-empty. Making this inequality weak characterizes a model with {A ∈ D | |A| ≤ 2} ⊆ support(π). Removing this condition, we would characterize a model where π(·) represents set intensities on choice which could be negative.
Lemma 3.1 shows that these conditions restrict choice of the default option to satisfy sequential independence. Therefore, a model where the default option is more preferred than some alternative would require a different characterization.
An RCCSR's appeal is being able to exhibit menu-dependent feasibility without assuming menu-dependent parameters. A counterpart to an RCCSR is a model with menu-dependent feasibility parameters. We define a menu-dependent random conditional choice set rule as a random choice rule P ,ν for which there exists a pair ( , ν), where is a strict total order on X and ν is a map ν : D × D \ ∅ → (0, 1), such that
However, a model with menu-dependent feasibility parameters has no empirical content.
Theorem 3.2. For every strict total order on X and for every random choice rule P , there exists a menu-dependent random conditional choice set rule P ,ν such that P = P ,ν .
Characterization of Random Consideration Set Rule
We now obtain the random consideration set rule of Manzini and Mariotti (2014) by replacing IFO with a constant marginal effects condition on the choice probability of the default option.
MIDO : (Menu Independent Default Option) For all a ∈ X and for all A, B ∈ D such that a ∈ A ∩ B then
This is MM's i-Independence on the default option. It restricts how the choice frequency of the default option changes once an alternative is removed from the menu. Specifically, the condition requires the effect to be menu independent. This condition is similar to the independence condition of Luce (1959) and is one reasonable way to restrict choice of the default option. Theorem 3.3. A random choice rule satisfies ASI, TSI, ESI, and MIDO if and only if it is a random consideration set rule P ,γ . Moreover, both and γ are unique, that is, for any random consideration set rule with P ,γ = P ,γ we have that ( , γ) = ( , γ ).
Comparison to Related Models
Although an RCCSR has a strong structure and a rational agent, it allows for deviations from a standard model of choice and permits correlation among feasible alternatives. Additionally, since the random consideration set rule is a special case of an RCCSR, an RCCSR can exhibit choice frequency reversals and violations of stochastic transitivity.
We examine the i-Asymmetry condition required for the random consideration set rule of MM. i-Asymmetry states that
This says that if removing b affects the choice probability of a in a menu, then removing a cannot affect the choice probability of b in the same menu. However, it is reasonable that removal of either alternative may affect the other's choice probability within a menu. We will show that an RCCSR allows violations of i-Asymmetry. First, return to the story of a researcher following an agent's choices in the introduction. Suppose in addition that the researcher has knowledge of alternatives that were available at the time of choice. It would be reasonable to think correlation exists between which objects are feasible. Correlation would mean that P r(a ∈ F (A) | b ∈ F (A)) = P r(a ∈ F (A)) for some a, b ∈ A with a = b. We note that a random consideration set rule does not allow these effects. The following example details a situation in which an RCCSR generates choice frequencies which violate i-Asymmetry and alternatives have correlation in availability. Looking at the pair a and b, we see that P (a, {a, c}) P (a, X) = 10 7 and P (b, {b, c}) P (b, X) = 20 13 which is a violation of i-Asymmetry. Here we see that a and b both benefit from the other's removal. Next, suppose that a researcher observes b is available when the agent chooses from X. Now, the researcher can back out the probability that a was also in the feasible set since
but P (a ∈ F (X)) = 7/20. As discussed earlier, if menus are subject to stock-outs this negative correlation may suggest that apples and bananas are substitutes since apples are less likely to be available given bananas are still available.
We now consider how an RCCSR compares to other models in the literature.
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Block and Marschak (1960) considered a class of stochastic choice functions known as random utility models. A random utility model is described by a probability measure over preference orderings, where the agent selects the maximal alternative available according to the randomly assigned preference ordering. Random utility models obey the regularity condition that P (a, B) ≥ P (a, A) for any a ∈ B ⊆ A. However, Example 1 violates this condition as seen by examining the choice probabilities of a in {a, b} and X. Therefore, RCCSRs are not nested in random utility models. Moreover, random utility models are not nested in RCCSRs. To see this, consider the model from Luce (1959) , which is a special case of a random utility model. The Luce model is of the form P (a, A) = u(a)
for a strictly positive utility function u and is characterized by the IIA condition.
16 However, an RCCSR will necessarily violate IIA when A ∈ D and |A| ≥ 3 since the ratio of the probability of choosing most preferred alternative over the probability of choosing the least preferred alternative will necessarily decrease once the middle-ranked alternative is removed from the menu. Lastly, we note that there are models which are both a random utility model and an RCCSR such as the random consideration set rule.
A recent model which appears similar to an RCCSR is the regular perceptionadjusted Luce model (rPALM) from Echenique, Saito, and Tserenjigmid (2014) . In fact, both an RCCSR and rPALM use conditions on hazard rates to characterize the models. Furthermore, both an RCCSR and rPALM accommodate violations of regularity, IIA, and stochastic transitivity. Nonetheless, an RCCSR and rPALM are distinct.
17 One strong prediction of an RCCSR is that choice frequency of the default alternative decreases as alternatives are added to a menu. However in an rPALM, 15 Like many models of stochastic choice, we do not explicitly model measurement or feasibility errors. However, it may be interesting to see if choice behavior similar to an RCCSR could be generated by a profit maximizing firm choosing a costly technology which yields a stochastic menu of goods to rational consumers.
16 IIA states that default alternative choice probabilities need not systematically increase or decrease since they are driven by a menu dependent parameter. An rPALM also requires ratios of hazard rates to be constant across menus and satisfy a regularity condition. Both of these conditions are difficult to interpret, but neither is required in an RCCSR. This suggests several ways to discern which model is appropriate from data.
The recent work of Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2014) axiomatizes an attribute rule where the decision maker first randomly chooses an attribute from all perceived attributes and then randomly selects an alternative containing the selected attribute. Every attribute rule is a random utility model and the Luce model is a special case. Therefore, an RCCSR and an attribute rule are not equivalent from the discussion of random utility models.
There are other works worthy of mention which take a different approach than those mentioned here. The models of Machina (1985) , Mattsson and Weibull (2002) , and Fudenberg, Iijima, and Strzalecki (2015) assume an agent has deterministic preferences over lotteries and chooses a probability distribution to maximize utility on a menu. Therefore, these models induce "stochastic choice" from deterministic preferences on lotteries. We refer the reader to the survey by Rieskamp, Busemeyer, and Mellers (2006) for a survey of other related works.
A Main Results
We present a series of lemmas which characterize the preference relation, properties on larger menus, and the proof of Lemma 3.1. We then present a statement of the Möbius inverse formula used in the proof of Theorem 3.1. The proof of Theorem 3.1 follows.
Lemma A.1. If ASI and TSI hold, then there exists a strict total order of X such that for any a, b ∈ X a b ⇔ P (b, {a, b}) = P (b, {b})P ({b, x * }, {a, b}).
Proof. The relation is asymmetric and weakly connected since by ASI for distinct a, b ∈ X we have that exactly one of the below is true
Suppose for a, b, c ∈ X that a b and b c. By definition we have P (b, {a, b}) = P (b, {b})P ({b, x * }, {a, b}) and P (c, {b, c}) = P (c, {c})P ({c, x * }, {b, c}).
By TSI we have that P (c, {a, c}) = P (c, {c})P ({c, x * }, {a, c}) so by definition of we have a c, so that is transitive. Lemma A.2. If ASI, TSI, and ESI hold, then for any menu A ∈ D there exists añ a ∈ A such that for all b ∈ A \ {ã} we have
Proof. By Lemma A.1 we know is strict, so for any A ∈ D there exists anã such thatã b for all b ∈ A \ {ã}. The result obviously holds for binary menus by ASI so assume |A| = 3 with A = {ã, b, c}. By definition of we know P (b, {ã, b}) = P (b, {b})P ({b, x * }, {ã, b}) and
By ESI we have
with an analogous statement for c. For|A| > 3 the result holds by induction.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Lemma A.2 established the existence of a maximal alternative in any menu, so let A ∈ D with |A| ≥ 2 and letã ∈ A be the maximal alternative. Using some basic algebra and the sequential independence result from Lemma A.2 we have that
Möbius inversion has been used in economics since Shapley (1953) . In particular, the result of Falmagne (1978) that the Block-Marschak polynomials are sufficient for a random utility model was proved by Fiorini (2004) using Möbius inversion. In general, it is a powerful tool to move between two functions when there is a partial order. Here we use the partial order over sets. We now present a version of Möbius inversion from Shafer (1976) . Theorem A.1. (Möbius inversion (Shafer, 1976) ) If Θ is a finite set with f and g functions on
for all A ⊆ Θ if and only if
for all A ⊆ Θ.
Using the expression from Section 3.1, this will hold for an RCCSR for Θ = X with g(A) = π(A) and f (A) = P (x * ,X) P (x * ,A)
. Corollary A.1. If P = P ,π is a RCCSR with D = 2 X then for all A ⊆ 2 X we have that
For the proof of the main result, we have that D may not be the power set. However, this will affect the above intuition by changing only a scaling factor. We now present the proof of the main result.
Proof of Theorem 3.1 . That an RCCSR satisfies ASI, TSI, ESI, and IFO is simple to check and is omitted here. Now, suppose |X| = N ≥ 1 and P is a random choice rule that satisfies ASI, TSI, ESI, and IFO. From Lemma A.1 and D rich, we can define an ordering on X which is a total order. We want to show that the P (·, ·) is an RCCSR. We prove the representation inductively on menu size. Let M = max A∈D |A| be the largest order of sets in D. Let D M = argmax A∈D |A| be the elements of D with maximal order. First, define λ : D → R such that for A ∈ D we have that
Note that this imposes λ ∅ = 1 P (x * ,∅) = 1. Moreover, we have that for A = {a} for a ∈ X that λ a = 1 P (x * , {a}) − 1 > 0 since P (x * , {a}) ∈ (0, 1) by definition of a random choice rule. For A ∈ D with |A| ≥ 2 since IFO is equivalent to positivity of the multiplicative polynomial
by dividing the polynomial by C⊆A P (x * , C). Using the Möbius inversion formula Theorem A.1 gives us that
We first examine the choice of the default option option from any menu A ∈ D. Here
Now, singleton menus are in D by richness. Thus, focusing on singleton menus A = {a} for a ∈ X the above result can be used to show that
Next, binary menus are in D by richness, so suppose that the menu is binary i.e. A = {a, b} for a, b ∈ X and that a b without loss of generality. By definition of we have P (b, {a, b}) = P (b, {b})P ({b, x * }, {a, b}) and by Lemma 3.1 that P (x * , {a, b}) = P (x * , {b})P ({b, x * }, {a, b}). Combining these two gives us
However, after a simple rearrangement we have that
This relates the ratios of probabilities to the weight function λ defined earlier. Moreover, using this result and Lemma A.2 and Lemma 3.1 it is clear that for any menu A and alternative b which is not the maximal elementã of in A, we have that
Using this and the earlier result from singleton menus it follows that
Next, examining the choice probability of a, the most preferred alternative in {a, b},
Summarizing, we have for any singleton or binary menu A and a ∈ A that
where as before A a = {B ⊆ A | a ∈ B and ∀b ∈ B \ {a} a b}. Assume inductively that the representation holds for menus of size m − 1 < M in D. Let A ∈ D be a menu such that |A| = m. Recall B ∈ D for all B ⊆ A from richness. Thus, for all a ∈ A then P (·, A \ {a}) satisfies the representation. From Lemma A.2 we have that there is a unique maximal elementã ∈ A. Therefore, for any b ∈ A \ {ã} we have
where the second equality follows by the induction hypothesis and (1) and the third equality follows because A b = (A \ {ã}) b sinceã b. Now examining the choice probability ofã in A we see that
where the second equality follows by the previous result and the third equality follows
We now have the appropriate definition but λ is not necessarily a probability. We defineλ :
. Thus, we have that
and for A ∈ D thatλ A ∈ (0, 1). Therefore,λ forms a valid full support probability distribution on D which is related to λ by a constant.
Therefore, we have that P is an RCCSR with as defined from Lemma A.1 and λ = π.
To show that ( , π) is unique, suppose that there exists a ( , π ) such that P ,π = P ,π . First, we note for singleton menus {a} ∈ D that
This means that π (∅) = απ(∅) for α > 0 and π ({a}) = απ({a}) for any singleton menu. Then, since = we know that there exist a b and b a so
However, cross multiplying equations, using the scale relation, and eliminating variables π ({a, b})(π({a}) + π({a, b})) + α(π({b}) + π(∅))π({a, b}) = 0. This is a contradiction since all of the quantities are positive. Therefore we have that = . The uniqueness of π follows immediately since is uniquely defined then π = απ. However, for π to be a probability requires α = 1. Therefore, the pair ( , π) is unique for each RCCSR.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The proof follows immediately from Theorem 2 in Manzini and Mariotti (2014) by letting ν(B, A) = b∈B δ(b, A) a∈A\B (1 − δ(a, A)) for δ defined as in the proof of Manzini and Mariotti (2014) .
Proof of Theorem 3.3. That a random consideration set rule satisfies ASI, TSI, ESI, and MIDO is simple to check and is omitted here. Now, suppose |X| = N ≥ 1 and P is a random choice rule that satisfies ASI, TSI, ESI, and MIDO. By Lemma A.1 and D rich, we can define an ordering on X which is a total order. Let M = max A∈D |A| be the largest order of sets in D. Let D M = argmax A∈D |A| be the elements of D with maximal order. We want to show that the P (·, ·) is a random consideration set rule. We prove the representation inductively on menu size.
For all a ∈ X we define λ a = λ(a) = P (a, {a}). Now examining the choice of the default option in any menu A ∈ D and any alternative a ∈ A, we have by MIDO that P (x * , A \ {a}) P (x * , A) = P (x * , ∅) P (x * , a) = 1 P (x * , a) ⇒ P (x * , A) = P (x * , {a})P (x * , A \ {a}).
Since the above argument was for a generic alternative and menu, we have
For singleton menus, the representation trivially holds. Next we examine the case of choice in binary menus. For a, b ∈ X we suppose without loss of generality that a b. By ASI and D rich , we have P (b, {a, b}) = P (b, {b})P ({x * , b}, {a, b}) = P (b, {b}) P (x * , {a, b}) P (x * , {b})
Where the second equality is by Lemma 3.1 and the third equality is by the representation of the choice of the default option in terms of λ. Then for the best alternative a, P (a, {a, b}) = 1 − P (b, {a, b}) − P (x * , {a, b})
Now assume that the representation holds for all sets of size m − 1 < M so if |A| < m P (a, A) = λ a b∈A|b a
(1 − λ b ). (1 − λ c ).
Where the first equality follows from Lemma A.2 and definition of , the second equality follows from Lemma 3.1, and the last equality follows sinceã b. Now examining the choice ofã, we have that P (ã, A) = 1 − P (A * \ {ã}, A) = 1 − P (x * , A) P (x * , A \ {ã}) = 1 − (1 − λã) = λã.
Therefore, P is a random consideration set rule with preference and attention parameters γ(a) = λ(a). Where for all a ∈ X we have γ(a) ∈ (0, 1) since P is a random choice rule and γ(a) = P (a, {a}). That this representation is unique follows immediately from Theorem 1 in Manzini and Mariotti (2014) .
